Inducing Natural Group Identity: A RDP Analysis

A relevance, distinctiveness and plausibility (RDP) analysis is a conceptual framework that can be used to identify when potential confounds are a problem for interpreting experimental results. We illustrate this analysis using the creation or enhancement of natural group identity by the means of priming manipulations as employed in the experiments of five target papers. Such priming manipulations may lead to experimenter demand effects and may spuriously induce behavior change. Using a RDP analysis, we show how these potential confounds are likely to be problematic for all but one of the target papers

Game Harmony: A Short Note

Strategic uncertainty in game theory may have two different general sources, either alone or in combination: uncertainty because of the existence of a coordination problem, and uncertainty because of a conflict between one own and the other n players' interests. Game harmony is conceived as a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of the n players are, as embodied in the game payoffs. Pure coordination games are examples of games with maximal game harmony; zero sum games are examples of games with very low game harmony. This note briefly describes attempts to measure game harmony simply as a real-valued number

Envy and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia

CSAE working paper WPS/2011-0

Group status, minorities and trust

We present the results of an experiment that attempts to measure the impact of majority and minority groups, and high status and low status groups, on well-being, cooperation and social capital. In the experiment, group membership is induced artificially, subjects interact with insiders and outsiders in trust games and periodically enter markets where they can trade group membership. We find that trust falls with groups because of discrimination against outsiders. Against this, however, there is evidence that low group status and minority subjects are less satisfied, and that low status subjects trust less other low status subjects

Group Status, Minorities and Trust

We present the results of an experiment measuring the impact of low group status and relative group size on trust, trustworthiness and discrimination. Subjects interact with insiders and outsiders in trust games and periodically enter markets where they can trade group membership. Low status and minority subjects have low morale: that is, they comparatively dislike being low status and being minority subjects. Group discrimination against low status and minority subjects is unchanged. However, low status subjects are deferential to high status subjects in terms of comparatively higher trust, and minority subjects are deferential to majority subjects in terms of comparatively higher trustworthiness

Envy and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia

The underlying motivations for envy or related social preferences and their impact on agricultural innovations are examined by combining data from money burning experimental game and household survey from Ethiopia. In the first stage of the money burning experimental game, income inequality is induced by providing different endowments and playing a lottery. In the second, people are allowed to decrease (‘burn’) other players’ money at their own expense. Conditional on individual behaviour, experimentally measured envious preferences from others have a negative effect on real life agricultural innovation.envy, social preferences, money burning games, agricultural innovations, Ethiopia

Inferential Expectations

We propose that the formation of beliefs be treated as statistical hypothesis tests, and we label such beliefs inferential expectations. If a belief is overturned through the build-up of evidence, agents are assumed to switch to the rational expectation. Rational expectations are shown to be a special (limiting) case of inferential expectations, with the test size a becoming a metric for rationality. When inferential expectations are built into a Dornbusch-style model of the exchange rate, regression tests of Uncovered Interest Parity and the rational expectations version of the term structure both display downward bias in the slope coefficient. We present the results of an experiment that supports inferential expectations.expectations; macroeconomics; rationality; uncovered interest parity; term structure; exchange rate

A simple stress test of experimenter demand effects

As a stress test of experimenter demand effects, we run an experiment where subjects can physically destroy coupons awarded to them. About one subject out of three does. Giving money back to the experimenter is possible in a separate task but is more consistent with an experimenter demand effect than an explanation based on altruism towards the experimenter. A measure of sensitivity to social pressure helps predict destruction when social information is provided

Game Harmony as a Predictor of Cooperation in 2 x 2 Games

This paper presents an experimental test of the relationship between game harmony and cooperation in 2 x 2 games. Game harmony measures describe how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs: coordination games and constant-sum games are examples of games of perfect harmony and disharmony, respectively; most games are somewhere in the middle. Correlation coefficients between measured harmony and cooperation rates were above 0.8 in an experiment with games such as the Prisoner`s Dilemma, the Stag-Hunt, a coordination game and three trust games, and above 0.55 in an experiment with random games.Game harmony, Cooperation, 2 x 2 games, Trust games, Social dilemmas

Preliminary Experimental Results on the Similarity Function in 2x2 and 3x3 Games

This paper employs two experimental datasets to assess along what dimensions agents evaluate whether two 2x2 or 3x3 games are similar. The Euclidean distance between the payoffs, the absolute difference in game harmony and the difference in mean and standard deviation between the games are all significant components of the estimated similarity function, and so is whether the two games have zero, unique or multiple pure Nash equilibria. However, our explanatory power is limited: substantial extra information can be gathered by collecting similarity evaluation data rather than relying just on our observable proxies